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Abstract
We study the monetary instrument problem in a model of optimal discretionary fiscal
and monetary policy. The policy problem is cast as a dynamic game between the central
bank, the fiscal authority, and the private sector. We show that, as long as there is a
conflict of interest between the two policy-makers, the central bank’s monetary instrument
choice critically affects the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. Focussing on
a scenario where the fiscal authority is impatient relative to the monetary authority, we
show that the equilibrium allocation is typically characterized by a public spending bias
if the central bank uses the nominal money supply as its instrument. If it uses instead the
nominal interest rate, the central bank can prevent distortions due to fiscal impatience
and implement the same equilibrium allocation that would obtain under cooperation of
two benevolent policy authorities. Despite this property, the welfare-maximizing choice
of instrument depends on the economic environment under consideration. In particular,
the money growth instrument is to be preferred whenever fiscal impatience has positive
welfare effects, which is easily possible under lack of commitment.
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1 Introduction
A prominent question in macroeconomics is whether a central bank should use the nominal
money supply or the nominal interest rate as intermediate target for its policy decisions. This
question, commonly referred to as the monetary instrument problem, was first raised forty years
ago by Poole (1970). While Poole’s original analysis was cast in a simple IS-LM framework, sub-
sequent research has examined the implications of rational expectations (Sargent and Wallace,
1975; McCallum, 1981) and variations in the economic environment (Canzoneri, Henderson,
and Rogoff, 1983; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1995; Collard and Dellas, 2005). Moreover, some re-
cent contributions also investigate how the (in)determinacy of rational expectations equilibria
may depend on the central bank’s instrument choice, and how these properties hinge on the
interaction with fiscal policy.1 All these studies point out that the desirability of money growth
versus interest rate rules may depend on the source and relative importance of macroeconomic
shocks, but they do not deliver an unambiguous conclusion about which instrument to prefer.
In this paper, we identify a novel dimension of the monetary instrument problem, which is com-
pletely independent from the existence of stochastic shocks. Instead, we argue that this problem
arises typically in models of optimal discretionary fiscal and monetary policy implemented by
separate - independent - authorities. Specifically, casting the optimal policy framework as a
dynamic non-cooperative game between the fiscal authority, the central bank, and the pri-
vate sector, we show that the allocation implemented in a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium is
critically affected by the monetary instrument choice. The pertinent welfare implications are
non-trivial.
Our modelling approach differs from the one commonly adopted in the literature concerned
with the characterization of optimal monetary and fiscal policies.2 There, the policy problem
is formalized as a constrained planning problem where a ‘monolithic’ policy maker chooses
1Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) characterize conditions under which interest rate feedback rules
ensure uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium, while Schabert (2006) provides results for money
supply rules.
2Prominent examples of this literature include Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
(1991), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Siu (2004), Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) and Klein, Krusell, and
Rios-Rull (2008).
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among all allocations that are consistent with a market equilibrium. As a consequence (i)
strategic interactions between separate policy makers governing monetary and fiscal policy,
respectively, are absent and (ii) the question of how desirable allocations can actually be im-
plemented through instruments directly available to these policy makers is not addressed. We
believe that this is an important shortcoming because, in most developed economies, monetary
and fiscal policies are determined by independent policy authorities with their own respective
mandates, but without direct control over allocations. It is therefore important to understand
which allocations are implementable within a given institutional framework and to assess the
corresponding welfare implications.
In our model, the instrument problem emerges since the two interacting policy makers’ objec-
tives are not perfectly aligned, which gives rise to a conflict of interest between them. Specifi-
cally, we assume that the monetary and fiscal policy makers agree on desirable allocations at a
given point in time, but that there may be disagreement over the intertemporal trade-offs in-
herent in policy making: we focus on the case where the central bank benevolent and the fiscal
authority is impatient in the sense of discounting future utility at a higher rate than society.3
We show that the monetary instrument choice has a strong effect on the distortion introduced
by fiscal impatience. Under a money growth policy, fiscal impatience leads to a government
spending bias, i.e., the level of government expenditures is higher than in the equilibrium allo-
cation that would obtain under a single, benevolent government authority (respectively, under
cooperation of benevolent fiscal and monetary authorities). Conversely, under an interest rate
policy fiscal impatience turns out to have no effect on the equilibrium allocation.
In the economy under consideration, the irrelevance of fiscal impatience under an interest rate
policy obtains as the central bank, by choosing the return on bonds, fully determines the
private sector’s asset allocation decision, i.e., how much money relative to bonds to carry into
the next period. The portfolio composition fully determines the future state of the economy
such that the fiscal authority’s optimal policy problem becomes static; the fiscal time preference
rate is therefore irrelevant for fiscal policy decisions and the equilibrium allocation. Finally,
3We view fiscal impatience as a short-cut to introduce politico-economic frictions such as electoral uncertainty
into the economy. Malley, Philippopoulos, and Woitek (2007) provide empirical evidence that such frictions
actually induce policies which resemble the behavior of an impatient fiscal policy maker.
3
we show that, even though the interest rate instrument eliminates distortions due to fiscal
impatience, it does not necessarily dominate the money supply instrument in terms of private
sector welfare. Rather, the optimal choice of instrument depends on the specific economic
environment under consideration; we identify the intertemporal elasticity of substitution as an
important determinant of the relevant welfare ranking.
In terms of methodology, our paper contributes to a recent literature which studies optimal
discretionary policies in dynamic macroeconomic models. This literature formulates the policy
problem as a game between successive governments, one for each time period, and analyzes
Markov-perfect equilibria of this game. Absent interaction with fiscal policy, King and Wolman
(2004) have established that a Markov-perfect monetary policy may fail to implement a unique
equilibrium through the control of nominal money balances.4 Dotsey and Hornstein (2008) show
that this non-uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibria is sensitive to the instrument employed by
the monetary authority: If the monetary authority chooses nominal interest rates rather than
the nominal money supply, there is a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. Adam and Billi (2007)
examine optimal monetary policy when the zero floor on nominal interest rates is fully taken
into account. Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2008) and Ortigueira (2006), in turn, study optimal
fiscal policy, i.e., public expenditures and taxation, in non-monetary economies. Finally, Diaz-
Gimenez, Giovannetti, Marimon, and Teles (2008), Martin (2009), Niemann, Pichler, and Sorger
(2009), Adam and Billi (2008), and Niemann (2009) examine monetary-fiscal interactions from
an optimal taxation perspective. The latter two contributions examine optimal discretionary
policy when fiscal and monetary policies are implemented by separate authorities engaged in a
non-cooperative game. Their focus is on the role of inflation conservatism in settings without
respectively with nominal government debt, yet they abstract from the possibility of a monetary
instrument problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the economic
environment under consideration and the first best allocation. In Section 3, we discuss equi-
librium in different scenarios; we first examine the cooperative equilibrium and then study two
non-cooperative equilibria which differ with respect to the monetary instrument employed. In
4Relatedly, Albanesi, Chari, and Christiano (2003) investigate ‘expectation traps’, i.e., the occurrence of
multiple expectations-driven equilibria, in a model of discretionary monetary policy.
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Section 4, we provide two numerical examples which illustrate the non-trivial welfare implica-
tions of the monetary instrument choice. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Model formulation
In this section we describe the framework of our analysis, which is a variant of the model
studied by Nicolini (1998).5 We start by describing the basic assumptions as well as the
first-best solution that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner. We then turn to the
setting of a decentralized market economy and discuss in detail how the private sector and the
government behave.
2.1 The basic environment
We consider a discrete-time model of an economy which consists of a government and a con-
tinuum (of measure 1) of identical private agents. The private agents are producer-consumers
who can transform labor into output at a unitary rate. The government purchases (part of the)
output and transforms it into a public good at a one-to-one rate. In period t, the representative
yeoman farmer supplies nt units of labor and consumes ct units of the private good, whereas
the government provides gt units of the public good. The aggregate resource constraint (output
market clearing condition) of the economy is therefore given by
ct + gt = nt. (1)
The private agents derive utility u(ct, gt) − αnt in period t, where α is a positive constant,
and where u is a utility function depending on the consumption of private and public goods,
respectively. We assume u to be continuous, increasing, and concave on its domain R2+, and
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave on the interior of its
domain. The private agents’ time-preference factor is given by β ∈ (0, 1) such that their lifetime
5Whereas Nicolini (1998) has studied his model under the assumption of commitment, we shall consider the
case of discretion. See Ellison and Rankin (2007), Diaz-Gimenez, Giovannetti, Marimon, and Teles (2008), and
Martin (2009) for recent papers analyzing discretionary policy in very similar frameworks.
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utility (welfare) is measured by
+∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ct, gt)− αnt]. (2)
The first-best (optimal) allocation is that allocation which maximizes the objective functional
in (2) subject to the resource constraint (1). It is characterized by the necessary and sufficient
first-order optimality conditions6
u1(ct, gt) = u2(ct, gt) = α (3)
and the constraint (1). Let (c∗, g∗, n∗) denote the unique solution of these three equations.
If the government were benevolent and able to directly choose the allocation, then it would
implement the first-best allocation.
In what follows, however, we postulate that the government cannot directly choose the alloca-
tion. Instead, we assume that the allocation must be decentralized via a restricted set of fiscal
and monetary policy instruments which are controlled by two separate authorities. We shall
refer to these authorities as the fiscal authority and the monetary authority, respectively.
Before discussing the policy instruments, we need to specify the set of assets that are available
in the economy. There are two such assets: money (cash) and one-period nominal government
bonds. A bond issued in period t promises to pay one unit of money in period t+1. We denote
by qt the price of a bond issued in period t (this is the reciprocal value of the gross nominal
interest rate on bond holdings from t to t+ 1).
2.2 The private agents
We denote by Mt and Bt the amounts of money and bonds, respectively, owned by the repre-
sentative producer-consumer at the start of period t. The private agents maximize the utility
functional in (2) with respect to (ct, nt,Mt+1, Bt+1)
+∞
t=0 subject to a cash-in-advance constraint
Mt ≥ Ptct, (4)
6The notation ui denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to the i-th argument. For the derivatives
of other functions we shall use an analogous notation.
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a flow budget constraint
Ptct +Mt+1 + qtBt+1 = Ptnt +Mt +Bt, (5)
and a solvency condition
lim
t→+∞
DtBt ≥ 0, (6)
where Pt is the price level in period t and Dt is the nominal discount factor defined by D0 = 1
and Dt =
∏t−1
s=0 qs for t ≥ 1.
The cash-in-advance constraint (4) says that consumption purchases must be made with cash
carried over from the previous period. Alternative but equivalent interpretations of (4) are
that, in any given period, the agents cannot trade bonds for money before making consumption
purchases, or that the goods market opens before the asset market; see Svensson (1985). The
flow budget constraint (5) shows how period-t labor income and financial wealth carried over
from period t − 1 (right-hand side) can be used for purchasing consumption goods and assets
to be taken into the next period (left-hand side). Finally, the solvency condition (6) stipulates
that the private agents must have non-negative wealth in the long-run (in present value terms).
Instead of the solvency condition (6) one could also impose the lifetime budget constraint
+∞∑
t=0
DtPtct +
+∞∑
t=0
Dt(Mt+1 −Mt) ≤ B0 +
+∞∑
t=0
DtPtnt. (7)
The left-hand side of (7) is the present value of lifetime consumption plus the present value of
all net purchases of money. The right-hand side is the initial bond holdings plus the present
value of lifetime earnings. Under the assumption that (5) holds and that all infinite sums in
(7) converge, conditions (6) and (7) are equivalent.
The Lagrangian function for the private agents’ optimization problem is
L =
+∞∑
t=0
βt {u(ct, gt)− αnt + λt(Ptnt +Mt +Bt − Ptct −Mt+1 − qtBt+1) + νt(Mt − Ptct)} ,
where λt and νt are non-negative multipliers. The corresponding first-order conditions are
u1(ct, gt)− (λt + νt)Pt = 0, (8)
−α + λtPt = 0, (9)
−λt + β(λt+1 + νt+1) = 0, (10)
−λtqt + βλt+1 = 0. (11)
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Using (9) to eliminate λt and λt+1 from (11) it follows that the gross real interest rate from
period t to t+ 1 is
rt = Pt/(qtPt+1) = 1/β. (12)
Equation (12) has several implications. First, it shows that the gross real interest rate must be
constant and equal to 1/β. Second, we have
1/qt = rt(Pt+1/Pt) = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt), (13)
which is the Fisher equation. Since the real interest rate is constant over time, the gross nominal
interest rate 1/qt and the gross rate of inflation Pt+1/Pt are proportional to each other. Finally,
(12) implies that
DtPt/P0 =
t−1∏
s=0
r−1s = β
t. (14)
Combining (8)-(10) and (12) we obtain
u1(ct+1, gt+1) = α/qt. (15)
When compared to (3), equation (15) demonstrates that deviations of qt below one are dis-
tortionary. A high nominal interest rate from period t to t + 1 (low value of qt) causes high
opportunity costs of holding money, because the money has to be held across periods to satisfy
the cash-in-advance constraint. As a consequence, private agents equalize the marginal util-
ity of next period’s consumption to the opportunity cost of holding money until next period.
This discussion also makes clear that private agents do not hold more money than necessary
whenever the nominal interest rate is positive. In other words, the cash-in-advance constraint
(4) must be binding whenever qt−1 < 1. When qt−1 = 1, on the other hand, the opportunity
cost of holding money vanishes and the agents are indifferent as to whether to hold financial
wealth in the form of money or in the form of bonds. In order to have a well-defined money
demand function also in this case, we simply assume that the agents hold the minimal amount
of money that is consistent with optimal behavior even if qt−1 = 1. In other words, we assume
that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality for all t ≥ 1.
If the cross partial derivative u12(c, g) does not vanish, (15) implies that fiscal policy is dis-
tortionary, too. Any change of public expenditure gt+1 directly affects the marginal utility of
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private consumption in period t + 1. On the other hand, if the utility function u is additively
separable with respect to private and public goods consumption, then it follows that fiscal
policy has no direct effect on the behavior of the private sector.
2.3 The government
Let us denote by M¯t and B¯t the cash in circulation and the amount of public debt outstanding
at the start of period t. It is assumed that M¯0 is strictly positive. The consolidated flow budget
constraint of the public sector is
Ptgt + B¯t = M¯t+1 − M¯t + qtB¯t+1. (16)
The left-hand side consists of public expenditures plus redemption of debt and the right-hand
side is seignorage income plus newly issued debt. There are no taxes. As in the case of the
private agents, we can augment this flow budget constraint either by the solvency condition
lim
T→+∞
DT B¯T ≤ 0 (17)
or by the lifetime budget constraint
+∞∑
t=0
DtPtgt + B¯0 ≤
+∞∑
t=0
Dt(M¯t+1 − M¯t). (18)
Given that (16) holds, the two conditions (17) and (18) are equivalent.
Having described the budget constraint of the government, we now turn to its internal structure
and its goals. First of all, we assume that the policy makers do not have any commitment power;
that is, we consider discretionary policy. In this situation, the government in period t can choose
period-t policy variables, but it cannot control policy variables for the future. The usual way
to model this is to assume that there exists a separate government in each period and that
each of these governments takes the policy rules of all future governments as given. Optimal
policy in such an environment therefore corresponds to a Nash equilibrium between successive
governments.
As for the behavior of the period-t government, we shall consider three scenarios. In the first
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one the government chooses the period-t instrument variables so as to maximize
+∞∑
s=t
(βG)s−t[u(cs, gs)− αns], (19)
where βG ∈ (0, 1) is the government’s time-preference factor, which may or may not coincide
with the private agents’ time-preference factor β. If βG = β holds, the government is benevolent.
The key assumption of this scenario is that monetary and fiscal policy decisions in each period
are made by a single authority, which is why we call this scenario the cooperative solution.
In the second and third scenario, on the other hand, we shall assume that the government in
each period consists of two separate authorities, one in charge of monetary policy and the other
one in charge of fiscal policy. The difference between the second and the third scenario consists
in the different policy instruments that are available to the monetary authority. In the second
scenario we will assume that the central bank sets the gross money growth rate µt = M¯t+1/M¯t;
conversely, in the third scenario we will assume that it sets the bond price qt (or, equivalently,
the gross nominal interest rate 1/qt). In either case, the monetary authority in period t seeks
to maximize
+∞∑
s=t
(βM)s−t[u(cs, gs)− αns], (20)
while the fiscal authority seeks to maximize
+∞∑
s=t
(βF )s−t[u(cs, gs)− αns], (21)
where βM ∈ (0, 1) and βF ∈ (0, 1) are the time-preference factors of the two authorities.
We allow for the possibility that βM differs from βF and that one or both of these time-
preference factors may be different from the private agents’ discount factor β. We are especially
interested in the case of fiscal impatience and a benevolent central bank, which is characterized
by βF < βM = β.
3 Equilibrium conditions
In this section we define and analyze the equilibrium of the model. Since the government
authorities take the behavior of the private agents as well as the market clearing mechanism as
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given, we start our discussion with a description of private-sector equilibrium for given policy
variables. After that, we explain how optimal policy is determined by the interplay of the
infinitely many incarnations of the fiscal and monetary authorities. Finally, having derived
the equilibrium dynamics and the continuation value functions, we discuss the three scenarios
(cooperative solution, money growth policy, and interest rate policy) in turn.
3.1 Private-sector equilibrium
A private-sector equilibrium is an allocation (ct, nt)
+∞
t=0 and a price sequence (Pt)
+∞
t=0 which
satisfy the feasibility and optimality conditions for the private agents as well as all market
clearing conditions for given policy instruments (gt, qt, B¯t+1, M¯t+1)
+∞
t=0 and given initial values
B¯0 and M¯0 > 0. Furthermore, we require that the government’s feasibility conditions (16)-(18)
are satisfied.
The output market clearing condition is given by (1). The two asset market clearing conditions
are
B¯t = Bt and M¯t =Mt. (22)
Substituting these conditions into (7) we see that the private agents’ lifetime budget constraint
(7) and the consolidated government lifetime budget constraint (18) are just two sides of the
same coin and that, in equilibrium, both of these equations have to hold with equality. The
same argument is obviously also true for the solvency conditions (6) and (17).
For our analysis it will be convenient to reformulate the lifetime budget constraint in a different
way. More specifically, condition (7) (holding with equality) can equivalently be written as7
+∞∑
t=0
DtPtct +
+∞∑
t=1
DtMt(1/qt−1 − 1) = B0 +M0 +
+∞∑
t=0
DtPtnt.
If we divide this equation by P0 and use (1) and (14) we get
+∞∑
t=1
βt(Mt/Pt)(1/qt−1 − 1) = (M0/P0)(1 + b0) +
+∞∑
t=0
βtgt, (23)
7The equivalence between the two formulations of the lifetime budget constraint holds under assumptions
that ensure the absolute convergence of the infinite sums. We assume these conditions to be satisfied whenever
we use the equivalence.
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where b0 = B0/M0 = B¯0/M¯0 is the public debt-to-money ratio in period 0.
Lemma 1 The first-best allocation can be supported as a private-sector equilibrium if and only
if
−1− g∗/[(1− β)c∗] ≤ b0 < −1.
Proof: If the first-best allocation is a private-sector equilibrium allocation, then it follows that
conditions (3) and (15) must hold simultaneously. Among other things this implies ct = c
∗,
gt = g
∗, and qt = 1 for all t. Substituting this into (23) we get
g∗/(1− β) = −(1 + b0)(M0/P0).
Since c∗ > 0, g∗ > 0, and M0/P0 ≥ c∗ (the latter inequality follows from the cash-in-advance
constraint), this can only hold if −g∗/[(1− β)c∗] ≤ 1 + b0 < 0.
Conversely, let P0 be a positive number to be specified below, and define ct = c
∗, gt = g∗,
nt = n
∗, qt = 1, Mt = M¯t = M¯0βt, Pt = P0βt, λt = α/Pt, and νt = 0 for all t. It is easy to
see that (8)-(11) hold with these specifications. Furthermore, we have Dt = 1 for all t, and
equation (16) yields
B¯T = B¯0 + [P0g
∗ + M¯0(1− β)](1− βT )/(1− β).
Together with Dt = 1 for all t this demonstrates that the solvency condition (17) holds as an
equality if and only if P0 = −(1 − β)(B¯0 + M¯0)/g∗ > 0, whereby the strict positivity of P0
follows from b0 < −1. It remains to verify the cash-in-advance constraint (4). Substituting the
above specifications, one obtains 1 ≥ −(1− β)(1 + b0)c∗/g∗, which holds by assumption. Since
all equilibrium conditions are satisfied, it follows that the first-best allocation can be supported
as a private-sector equilibrium. ¤
The lemma shows that the first-best allocation can be supported as a private-sector equilibrium
if and only if the government has a strictly positive initial asset position −(B¯0+M¯0) and private
agents’ initial financial debt −(B0 +M0) is not too large.8 To understand this finding, first
observe that the first-best allocation can only be implemented under the Friedman rule, qt = 1
8More precisely, private debt must not exceed M0g∗/[(1− β)c∗].
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for all t. This follows from (3) and (15). Moreover, because M¯0 > 0 is assumed, a non-positive
asset position of the government would imply that it has strictly positive debt. Since the
government has real expenditures g∗ > 0 in each period, the present value of its debt cannot
converge to zero as required by the solvency condition (17). On the other hand, if initial debt
of the private agents is too large, they will not be able to satisfy the solvency condition (6)
even if they sell g∗ units of the final good to the government in each period. In what follows,
we want to rule out that the first-best solution can be achieved, and we do so by assuming that
b0 = b¯0 > −1.
So far, we have described the behavior of the private sector in dependence of the bond price
qt, see equation (15). For later purposes, however, it will be convenient to rewrite the private
agents’ optimality condition in terms of the money growth rate µt. To this end, recall that we
have assumed that the cash-in-advance constraint (4) holds as an equality in all periods, even
if the nominal interest rate is equal to zero (i.e., if qt = 1). Together with the money market
clearing condition in (22) this implies that Ptct = M¯t and Pt+1ct+1 = M¯t+1. Dividing the latter
equation by the former and using (12) it follows that
µt = βct+1/(qtct). (24)
Substituting this into (15) we obtain
βu1(ct+1, gt+1)ct+1/α = µtct. (25)
This equation describes how private agents optimally react to the money growth rate µt.
3.2 Equilibrium dynamics and continuation value functions
Up to now we have assumed given settings of the policy instruments. We now turn to the
characterization of optimal policy. As we have already mentioned in Subsection 2.3, the gov-
ernment’s lack of commitment implies that optimality has to be understood in the sense of a
Nash equilibrium in a game between successive governments. Since this is a dynamic game,
strategies can in principle depend on the entire history of the game. It is common, however,
to restrict attention to those strategies that depend only on a minimal payoff-relevant state.
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From (4), only money can be used to make purchases in the goods market. Therefore, the state
must summarize the composition of private agents’ nominal asset portfolios. For this reason,
the debt-to-money ratio is an appropriate state variable for the model, and we will express all
period-t variables as functions of the period-t state bt = Bt/Mt.
9 In particular, we will adopt a
notation of the form ct = C(bt), qt = Q(bt), gt = G(bt), µt =M(bt), etc.
From the flow budget constraint (16), the asset market clearing conditions (22), the cash-in-
advance constraint (4) holding with equality, and the definition bt = Bt/Mt we obtain
gt + (1 + bt)ct = µtct(1 + qtbt+1) (26)
for all t. In equilibrium it holds that gt = G(bt), qt = Q(bt), µt = M(bt), and ct = C(bt).
Hence, under equilibrium behavior, equation (26) can be solved uniquely for bt+1 as a function
of bt. We shall denote this solution by bt+1 = B(bt) and will refer to B as the equilibrium state
dynamics.
Since the strategies that form a policy equilibrium must induce a private-sector equilibrium,
conditions (15) and (24) must hold identically for all possible states b > −1. By using these
conditions in (26) we obtain
G(b) + (1 + b)C(b) = F (B(b)),
where
F (b) = βC(b)[u1(C(b),G(b))/α+ b]. (27)
Hence, it follows that
B(b) = F−1(G(b) + (1 + b)C(b)).
Differentiating this equation with respect to b and evaluating it at b = bt it follows that
B1(bt) = [G1(bt) + ct + (1 + bt)C1(bt)]/F1(bt+1) (28)
must hold for all t.
Even if the government (or the two authorities) in period t can only choose the instruments
in that period, they care about welfare derived throughout the entire infinite planning horizon
9Notice also that the allocation implemented in the model under commitment depends on the value b0 (see,
e.g., Ellison and Rankin, 2007).
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{t, t+1, . . .} as specified by their objective functionals in (19)-(21). Consider, for example, the
government’s objective functional in (19) and note that it can be rewritten as
u(ct, gt)− α(ct + gt) + βGV G(bt+1), (29)
where the market clearing condition (1) has already been used and where V G(bt+1) is the con-
tinuation value for the period-t government, i.e., the part of the period-t government’s objective
functional that it can only affect indirectly via the state variable bt+1. This continuation value
function must satisfy the recursive equation
V G(b) = u(C(b),G(b))− α[C(b) + G(b)] + βGV G(B(b)).
Since the above equation must hold identically for all values of b, we may also differentiate it
with respect to b. Evaluating the result at b = bt and introducing the notation w
c
t = u1(ct, gt)−α
and wgt = u2(ct, gt)− α one gets
V G1 (bt) = w
c
tC1(bt) + wgtG1(bt) + βGV G1 (bt+1)B1(bt) (30)
for all t.
Note that wct and w
g
t are the wedges between the marginal utility of consumption of private and
public goods in period t and the marginal cost of producing these goods. These wedges must be
zero along the first-best allocation, but they are typically not equal to zero in an equilibrium.
Furthermore, it follows from (8)-(9) that wct ≥ 0 must hold for all t.
Equations (29)-(30) have been derived under the assumptions characterizing the first scenario,
i.e., that there is a single government authority in each period which has a time-preference
parameter βG and evaluates allocations according to (19). In a completely analogous way
we can derive corresponding equations for scenarios 2 and 3 in which there are two separate
authorities with the objective functionals (20) and (21), respectively. These equations are given
by
u(ct, gt)− α(ct + gt) + βMV M(bt+1) (31)
and
V M1 (bt) = w
c
tC1(bt) + wgtG1(bt) + βMV M1 (bt+1)B1(bt) (32)
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for the monetary authority, and by
u(ct, gt)− α(ct + gt) + βFV F (bt+1) (33)
and
V F1 (bt) = w
c
tC1(bt) + wgtG1(bt) + βFV F1 (bt+1)B1(bt) (34)
for the fiscal authority, respectively. We shall now discuss the three scenarios in turn.
3.3 Scenario 1: cooperative solution
In this subsection we assume that both fiscal and monetary policies in period t are determined
by a single authority with objective functional (19) or, equivalently, (29). The solution in this
case, which we call the cooperative solution, is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If (ct, gt, bt)
+∞
t=0 is an equilibrium outcome in scenario 1, then it must satisfy
the following system of difference equations:
gt + (1 + bt)ct = F (bt+1), (35)
wct = (1 + bt)w
g
t , (36)
wgtF1(bt+1) = β
Gct+1w
g
t+1. (37)
Proof: The problem of the period-t government in the present scenario is to maximize the ob-
jective function in (29) subject to the flow budget constraint (26) as well as the implementability
conditions (15) and (25). Following a primal approach, we eliminate the policy variables qt and
µt using (15) and (25). This allows us to write the government’s optimization problem as the
maximization with respect to (ct, gt, bt+1) of the objective function in (29) subject to the single
constraint (35). The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are (36) and
βGV G1 (bt+1) = −wgtF1(bt+1). (38)
It follows that the cooperative solution is characterized by equations (30), (35)-(36), and (38)
holding for all t. Using (28), (36), and (38), we can rewrite (30) as (37). This completes the
proof of the proposition. ¤
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The system of three difference equations (35)-(37) in the variables (ct, gt, bt) fully describes the
cooperative solution. Note that these conditions are generalized Euler equations because the
terms F (bt+1) and F1(bt+1) in (35) and (37) contain the unknown policy functions C and G as
well as their derivatives. In Section 4 below we shall use a numerical approach to compute
these policy functions in examples with parametrically specified utility functions. But even
without knowing the policy functions C and G, it is possible to derive some analytical results
from Proposition 1. The following corollary is one such example.
Corollary 1 If (c¯, g¯, b¯) is a steady state solution of equations (35)-(37), then it follows that
b¯C1(b¯)
c¯
=
βG − β
β
+
1
α
[(
1
σ¯
− 1
)
u11(c¯, g¯)C1(b¯)− u12(c¯, g¯)G1(b¯)
]
, (39)
where σ¯ = −c¯u11(c¯, g¯)/u1(c¯, g¯) is the elasticity of the marginal utility of private consumption
with respect to c evaluated at the steady state.
Proof: Differentiating (27) with respect to b one gets
F1(b) = βC1(b)
[
u1(C(b),G(b))
α
+ b
]
+ βC(b)
[
u11(C(b),G(b))C1(b) + u12(C(b),G(b))G1(b)
α
+ 1
]
.
This equation can equivalently be written as
F1(b) = βC(b)
{
1 +
C1(b)b
C(b) +
u11(C(b),G(b))C1(b)[1− 1/σ(b)] + u12(C(b),G(b))G1(b)
α
}
,
where σ(b) = −C(b)u11(C(b),G(b))/u1(C(b),G(b)). Using this expression for F1(b), one can
rewrite (37) as
βGwgt+1
βwgt
= 1 +
C1(bt+1)bt+1
ct+1
+
u11(ct+1, gt+1)C1(bt+1)[1− 1/σ(bt+1)] + u12(ct+1, gt+1)G1(bt+1)
α
.
In a steady state this equation simplifies to (39). ¤
The left-hand side of (39) is the elasticity of private consumption with respect to the debt-
to-money ratio. Provided the cross-derivative u12(c¯, g¯) is non-negative, consumption of private
goods can be shown to be a strictly decreasing function of the debt-to-money ratio such that
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C1(b) < 0 in the neighborhood of a stable steady state.10 Moreover, in all our numerical
examples we found private consumption to be strictly decreasing in b even for u12(c¯, g¯) < 0.
The implication of C1(b¯) < 0 is that the right-hand side of (39) and the steady state value
b¯ must have opposite signs, which allows us to draw some interesting conclusions. First, if
the government is benevolent (βG = β) and the utility function u is additively separable
(u12(c¯, g¯) = 0), then it follows that the sign of the steady-state debt is solely determined by the
value of σ¯. More specifically, b¯ is positive, zero, or negative depending on whether σ¯ is greater
than, equal to, or smaller than one.11
Equation (39) furthermore shows that this clear-cut characterization of the sign of the long-run
debt level breaks down if the government’s time-preference factor differs from that of the private
sector, or if the utility function is not additively separable. In particular, (39) suggests that,
at least in the additively separable case, an impatient government (βG < β) induces upward
pressure on the long-run debt-to-money ratio.
3.4 Scenario 2: money growth policy
Now let us consider the case in which there are two separate authorities which seek to max-
imize their respective objective functionals in (31) and (33). The two authorities act non-
cooperatively and under discretion, which means that both of them take their opponent’s
policy function as well as the policy functions of all future authorities as given. Furthermore,
we assume that the central bank sets the money growth rate µt.
10To see this, observe that stability of a steady state at b¯ > −1 requires B1(b¯) < 1, while (28) implies
B1(b¯) = [G1(b¯)+ c¯+(1+ b¯)C1(b¯)]/F1(b¯). Hence, since (37), evaluated at b¯, implies F1(b¯) = βGc¯, stability requires
G1(b¯) + (1 + b¯)C1(b¯) < 0. Next, differentiate (36) to obtain[
u11(c¯, g¯)− (1 + b¯)u21(c¯, g¯)
] C1(b¯) + [u12(c¯, g¯)− (1 + b¯)u22(c¯, g¯)]G1(b¯) = wg > 0.
Here, note that u11, u22 < 0 and u12 = u21 ≥ 0 together imply that the first expression in squared brackets is
negative, while the second one is positive. Now suppose C1(b¯) > 0. To satisfy the above equation, we then must
have G1(b¯) > 0 such that G1(b¯) + (1 + b¯)C1(b¯) > 0. Since this is a contradiction to the stability requirement, it
follows that C1(b¯) < 0.
11This is a result that has also been derived in a similar framework by Martin (2009, Proposition 5).
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Since qt is not an instrument variable, we eliminate it using (24). This turns the flow budget
constraint (26) into
gt + (1 + bt)ct = µtct + βbt+1C(bt+1). (40)
The monetary authority maximizes the utility function (31) with respect to µt, ct, and bt+1 and
subject to the flow budget constraint (40) and the implementability constraint (25), whereby
it takes bt and gt as given. The next lemma presents the first-order optimality conditions for
this optimization problem.
Lemma 2 Optimal behavior of the monetary authority in scenario 2 implies
gt + (1 + bt)ct = F (bt+1), (41)
βMV M1 (bt+1) = −wctF1(bt+1)/(1 + bt). (42)
Proof: Using (25) to eliminate the money growth rate µt from (40) we obtain (41). The
monetary authority’s optimization problem can therefore equivalently be formulated as the
maximization of (31) with respect to (ct, bt+1) and subject to the single constraint (41). The
first-order optimality condition for this problem is (42). ¤
Let us now turn to the fiscal authority’s problem. It maximizes (33) with respect to (ct, gt, bt+1)
and subject to (40) and (25), whereby it takes bt and µt as given. The next lemma derives the
optimality conditions for this problem. To simplify its statement, let us define the function H
by
H(b) = F (b)− βC(b)b,
where F is defined in (27).
Lemma 3 Optimal behavior of the fiscal authority in scenario 2 implies
βFV F1 (bt+1) = −[wct − (1 + bt)wgt ]H1(bt+1)/µt − wgtF1(bt+1). (43)
Proof: First note that (27) implies that
H(b) = βu1(C(b),G(b))C(b)/α.
19
Using this observation, it is straightforward to verify that the two constraints (40) and (25)
together are equivalent to ct = H(bt+1)/µt and gt = K(bt+1; bt, µt), where
K(b′; b, µ) = H(b′)[1− (1 + b)/µ] + βC(b′)b′.
Thus, one can write the fiscal authority’s optimization problem as the unconstrained maximiza-
tion with respect to bt+1 of
u(H(bt+1)/µt, K(bt+1; bt, µt))− α[H(bt+1)(1− bt/µt) + βC(bt+1)bt+1] + βFV F (bt+1).
The first-order optimality condition is
u1(ct, gt)H1(bt+1)/µt + u2(ct, gt)K1(bt+1; bt, µt)
−α[H1(bt+1)(1− bt/µt) + βC1(bt+1)bt+1 + βct+1] + βFV F1 (bt+1) = 0.
Using the definitions of K and H, this condition can also be written in the form of (43). ¤
We are now ready to collect all equilibrium conditions for the money growth scenario. In order
to compare them more easily to those for the cooperative solution, we again formulate them as
a system of three difference equations in the variables (bt, ct, gt).
Proposition 2 If (ct, gt, bt)
+∞
t=0 is an equilibrium outcome in scenario 2, then it must satisfy
the following system of difference equations:
gt + (1 + bt)ct = F (bt+1), (44)
wctF1(bt+1)
1 + bt
=
βMct+1w
c
t+1
1 + bt+1
+
βM [wct+1 − (1 + bt+1)wgt+1]G1(bt+1)
1 + bt+1
, (45)
wgtF1(bt+1) +
[wct − (1 + bt)wgt ]H1(bt+1)ct
H(bt+1)
= βF ct+1w
g
t+1 + β
F [wct+1 − (1 + bt+1)wgt+1]At+1, (46)
where
At+1 =
H1(bt+2)ct+1
H(bt+2)F1(bt+2)
[G1(bt+1) + ct+1 + (1 + bt+1)C1(bt+1)]− C1(bt+1).
Proof: From the above analysis we know that equilibrium in the second scenario is described
by equations (25), (32), (34), (41), (42), and (43). Equation (44) is simply a restatement of
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(41) and therefore has to hold. Using (28) and (42) to eliminate V M1 from (32) yields (45).
Analogously, we use (28) and (43) to eliminate V F1 from (34) which yields
wgtF1(bt+1) + [w
c
t − (1 + bt)wgt ]H1(bt+1)/µt = βF ct+1wgt+1 + βF [wct+1 − (1 + bt+1)wgt+1]A˜t+1,
where
A˜t+1 =
H1(bt+2)
µt+1F1(bt+2)
[G1(bt+1) + ct+1 + (1 + bt+1)C1(bt+1)]− C1(bt+1).
Finally, we use (25) to eliminate µt and µt+1 from the above equation to obtain (46). ¤
Due to the complexity of the equilibrium conditions for this scenario, we were unable to derive
any substantial analytical results for the general case. The following corollary therefore consid-
ers the special case in which the utility function is additively separable as well as logarithmic
in private consumption.12
Corollary 2 Suppose that u(c, g) = γ ln(c) + v(g). If (c¯, g¯, b¯) is a steady state solution of
equations (44)-(46), then it follows that
b¯C1(b¯)
c¯
=
βM − β
β
+
βF − βM
β
[
1 +
βF w¯cC1(b¯)
βM w¯gG1(b¯)
]−1
. (47)
Proof: When the utility function has the form specified in the corollary, then it follows that
F1(b) = β[C(b) + bC1(b)], H1(b) = 0, and At+1 = −C1(bt+1). Substituting these expressions into
(45)-(46) and evaluating at the steady state one gets
βw¯c[c¯+ b¯C1(b¯)] = βM
{
c¯w¯c + [w¯c − (1 + b¯)w¯g]G1(b¯)
}
,
βw¯g[c¯+ b¯C1(b¯)] = βF
{
c¯w¯g − [w¯c − (1 + b¯)w¯g]C1(b¯)
}
.
These two equations can equivalently be written as
[
1− (1 + b¯)(w¯g/w¯c)]G1(b¯) = (β/βM)[c¯+ b¯C1(b¯)]− c¯,[
1− (1 + b¯)(w¯g/w¯c)]G1(b¯) [βM + βF w¯cC1(b¯)
w¯gG1(b¯)
]
= c¯(βF − βM).
Using the first of these equations to eliminate the term
[
1− (1 + b¯)(w¯g/w¯c)]G1(b¯) from the
second equation one obtains after simple rearrangements equation (47). ¤
12In Section 4 below we shall return to the general case and solve it using numerical methods.
21
It is instructive to compare the above corollary with the corresponding result for the cooperative
solution. Under the assumptions of Corollary 2, equation (39) in Corollary 1 boils down to
b¯C1(b¯)/c¯ = (βG − β)/β. Obviously, equation (47) coincides with this result in the case where
both authorities have the common time-preference factor βF = βM = βG. The second term
on the right-hand side of (47), however, emerges only if the two authorities’ objectives diverge,
that is, if βM 6= βF . This term therefore captures the effect of the strategic interaction of the
two authorities on the long-run debt-to-money ratio. Equation (47) furthermore demonstrates
that the two authorities’ time-preference rates play quite different roles in the determination of
equilibrium, an observation that will recur in even more dramatic form in the next subsection.
3.5 Scenario 3: interest rate policy
Finally, we consider the case where the two authorities act non-cooperatively but where the
central bank sets the bond price qt (or, equivalently, the gross nominal interest rate 1/qt).
Because µt is not an instrument variable, we eliminate it using (24). This turns the flow budget
constraint (26) into
gt + (1 + bt)ct = βC(bt+1)(1/qt + bt+1). (48)
Let us again start with the monetary authority’s optimization problem. It consists of choos-
ing qt, ct, and bt+1 so as to maximize the objective function (31) subject to the flow budget
constraint (48) and the implementability constraint (15), whereby gt and bt are taken as given.
The following lemma demonstrates that this problem is identical to the monetary authority’s
optimization problem from scenario 2 such that the conditions stated in Lemma 2 remain valid.
Lemma 4 Optimal behavior of the monetary authority in scenario 3 implies that conditions
(41)-(42) hold.
Proof: Using (15) to eliminate the bond price qt from (48), the monetary authority is seen to
maximize (31) with respect to (ct, bt+1) and subject to the single constraint (41). This is the
same problem as that from scenario 2. Hence, the first-order condition (42) must hold. ¤
Now let us turn to the fiscal authority’s optimization problem. This authority maximizes the
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objective function (33) with respect to (ct, gt, bt+1) and subject to (48) and (15), whereby it
takes bt and qt as given. It is important to note that (15) determines bt+1 independently of the
fiscal authority’s actions. Indeed, using the fact that the monetary authority in period t and
all future authorities as well as the private agents use their respective equilibrium strategies,
equation (15) can be written as
u1(C(bt+1),G(bt+1)) = α/Q(bt).
Given bt, this is an equation for the single unknown variable bt+1, and it does not involve the
fiscal authority’s other control variable gt. Although there could, in principle, exist multiple
solutions to this equation, the solutions are generically isolated. As a matter of fact, in all our
numerical examples studied below, the above equation is satisfied by a unique value bt+1. In
other words, the fiscal authority in period t has to take bt+1 as given. This, in turn, implies
that the term βFV F (bt+1) in the fiscal authority’s objective functional (33) is irrelevant for the
maximization problem such that we can drop it along with the decision variable bt+1. Finally, we
observe that by eliminating qt from the two constraints (48) and (15), one obtains (35). Hence,
the fiscal authority chooses (ct, gt) so as to maximize u(ct, gt)− α(ct + gt) subject to (35). The
first-order condition for this optimization problem is wct = (1 + bt)w
g
t , which is identical to
condition (36) from the cooperative solution. The above observations are summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5 Optimal behavior of the fiscal authority in scenario 3 implies that conditions (35)-
(36) hold.
Summarizing the results for the interest rate policy scenario we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (a) If (ct, gt, bt)
+∞
t=0 is an equilibrium outcome in scenario 3, then it must satisfy
the following system of difference equations:
gt + (1 + bt)ct = F (bt+1), (49)
wct = (1 + bt)w
g
t , (50)
wgtF1(bt+1) = β
Mct+1w
g
t+1. (51)
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(b) The equilibrium conditions in scenario 3 are identical to those of scenario 1 when βG is
replaced by βM .
(c) Equilibrium values in scenario 3 are independent of the fiscal authority’s time-preference
factor βF .
(d) If βF 6= βM , then there is an instrument problem for the monetary authority, that is, its
choice of the policy instrument affects the equilibrium allocation of the economy.
Proof: (a) The results derived so far show that equilibrium in scenario 3 is described by
equations (32), (35), (36), (41), and (42). Both equations (35) and (41) are identical to (49),
and equation (36) is identical to (50). Using (28), (36), and (42) we can write (32) as (51).
This completes the proof of part (a).
(b) This statement follows immediately from a comparison of conditions (35)-(37) and (49)-(51),
respectively.
(c) This statement is obvious from the equilibrium conditions stated in part (a).
(d) In order to prove this statement, we show that, whenever a sequence of variables (ct, gt, bt)
simultaneously satisfies conditions (44)-(46) and (49)-(51), then it follows that βF = βM . Since
(50) holds for all t, equations (45) and (46) simplify to
wctF1(bt+1)/(1 + bt) = β
Mct+1w
c
t+1/(1 + bt+1)
and
wgtF1(bt+1) = β
F ct+1w
g
t+1. (52)
Using (50) again, it is easily seen that the former equation is equivalent to
wgtF1(bt+1) = β
Mct+1w
g
t+1.
Comparing this equation to (52) it becomes apparent that βF = βM must hold. ¤
Proposition 3 is the main analytical result of this paper. Parts (a)-(c) together reveal that the
strategic interaction between the fiscal and the monetary authority does not create any addi-
tional distortion when the central bank uses the nominal interest rate as its instrument. Instead,
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the equilibrium in this scenario coincides with the one that emerges if a single government au-
thority decides on both fiscal and monetary policies (provided that the single government’s
time-preference factor coincides with that of the monetary authority in scenario 3). Interest-
ingly, the fiscal authority’s time-preference factor is completely irrelevant for the equilibrium
in scenario 3. The key to understanding these findings is the observation pointed out already
earlier in this subsection: if the monetary authority sets the interest rate, the fiscal author-
ity’s optimization problem becomes a static one because the interest rate fully determines next
period’s debt-to-money ratio. As a consequence of Proposition 3(c), it does not matter at all
for the equilibrium whether or not the fiscal authority displays stronger impatience than the
monetary authority.
Proposition 2 and parts (b) and (d) of Proposition 3 show that, in the case where the monetary
authority controls the money growth rate, the strategic interaction between the two authorities
manifests itself in a distortion from the cooperative solution as long as the two authorities do
not share the same objective functional (i.e., the same time-preference factor). If they do share
the same time-preference rate, there is no strategic conflict between the two authorities, and
the Nash equilibrium coincides with the cooperative solution.
Proposition 3(d) raises the question of whether one instrument is to be preferred over the other
in terms of welfare. To examine this question first recall that the monetary authority can
eliminate distortions through fiscal impatience by choosing the interest rate as its instrument;
see parts (b)-(c) of Proposition 3. One might think that, due to this property, the interest
rate policy is preferable in terms of private-sector welfare. However, this is not obvious under
discretionary policy-making. Under lack of commitment, a non-benevolent policy-maker could
potentially implement better policies than a benevolent one, as has been demonstrated by
Rogoff (1985). The intuition behind this result is that the departure from benevolence may
mitigate the policy-maker’s time-inconsistency problem. Thus, in the present context, whether
or not the interest rate instrument is preferred over the money growth instrument will crucially
depend on the nature of the time-inconsistency problem faced by the policy makers which, in
turn, depends on the specific economic environment under consideration. We shall investigate
this property in the following section using numerical examples.
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4 Numerical examples
In this section we present some numerical results for the case in which the utility function takes
the form
u(c, g) =
(cγ1g1−γ1)1−γ2 − 1
1− γ2 ,
where γ1 ∈ (0, 1) and γ2 > 0 are exogenous parameters. The parameter γ1 measures the
relative weight of private versus public consumption in the Cobb-Douglas aggregate cγ1g1−γ1 .
The parameter γ2 determines the (constant) elasticity of intertemporal substitution with respect
to this aggregate. Moreover, γ2 determines the sign of the cross partial derivative
u12(c, g) =
γ1(1− γ1)(1− γ2) (cγ1g1−γ1)1−γ2
cg
.
Thus, depending on the value taken by γ2, c and g enter the utility function as substitutes
(γ2 > 1) or as complements (0 < γ2 < 1).
We shall present results for two examples that differ from each other in the numerical values
assumed for γ2, and thus in the substitutability of c and g. In the first example we assume
γ2 = 1, which implies that the utility function takes the additively separable form u(c, g) =
γ1 log c + (1 − γ1) log g. In this case the cross partial derivative u12(c, g) vanishes. Note that
this case allows for some analytical results which are not available for other values of γ2;
see Corollaries 1 and 2. In the second example we examine the case γ2 = 0.4, where the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is relatively high and private and public consumption
are complementary goods. This case is interesting because it leads to fundamentally different
normative conclusions than those obtained for γ2 = 1.
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4.1 Additively separable utility with unit-elastic preferences
As explained above, unit-elastic preferences obtain for γ2 = 1. For both the money growth sce-
nario 2 and the interest rate scenario 3 we compute numerical approximations to the equilibrium
13We will not separately discuss results for the case γ2 > 1. We have experimented with several values for γ2
larger than one and found the results to be qualitatively similar to those for γ2 = 1. For space considerations
these results are omitted from the paper, but they are available upon request.
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policy functions C, G, and B as well as the private sector value function V using collocation
projection methods as described in Judd (1992, 1998). This requires, first, to postulate values
for the remaining model parameters β, βM , βF , α, and γ1. Since the nature of our numerical ex-
ercise is mainly illustrative, we choose these values in a simple fashion. We set β = βM = 0.96,
which corresponds to an annual real interest rate of close to 4%. Note that the monetary
authority is assumed to be benevolent. As for the fiscal authority, we assume that it is more
impatient, which is reflected by βF = 0.8. Finally, we choose α = 2/3 and γ1 = 5/6, which
implies that that steady-state consumption levels of private and public goods in the cooperative
solution with a benevolent government are given by c¯ = 1 and g¯ = 1/5, respectively.14
Figure 1 displays approximations to G, B, C and V . To interpret these functions, it is useful
to recall that the equilibrium obtained under the interest rate instrument coincides with the
equilibrium that would obtain under a single, benevolent government authority deciding over
both fiscal and monetary policies. This equilibrium is thus independent of βF ; in other words,
fiscal impatience is irrelevant under an interest rate instrument choice. By contrast, under the
money growth instrument, fiscal impatience does affect the equilibrium policy functions and
allocation. Inspecting Figure 1, we observe that this property manifests itself in a higher level of
public consumption (a public spending bias) and a higher level of debt issuance under the money
growth instrument choice compared to the interest rate instrument choice. Moreover, it leads to
a lower level of private consumption. Intuitively, this results from fiscal impatience distorting
the private sector’s optimal trade-off between current and future utilities, i.e., current utility is
too high relative to future utility, and the household responds to this misallocation by reducing
private consumption. Finally, the bottom-right panel of Figure 1 shows that, independent of
the level of b, private-sector welfare is lower under the money growth instrument than under
the interest rate instrument. Thus the interest rate is to be preferred over the money growth
rate as the monetary instrument.
14To see this, observe that in the present case where u(c, g) = γ1 log c + (1 − γ1) log g, Corollary 1 implies
that b¯ = 0 provided that βG = β. Using this fact, it is easily seen that the steady-state versions of equations
(35)-(36) can be written as g¯ + c¯ = βγ1/α and γ1/c¯ = (1 − γ1)/g¯, respectively, which yields the stated values
for c¯ and g¯.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium policy and value functions (γ2 = 1)
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Notes: the figure displays numerical approximations to the public consumption policy G(b) (top-left panel),
the debt policy B(b) (top-right panel), the private consumption policy C(b) (bottom-left panel), and the value
function V (b) (bottom-right panel) under the interest rate instrument policy (solid line) and the money growth
instrument policy (dashed line). The underlying parameters are β = βM = 0.96, βF = 0.8, α = 2/3, γ1 = 5/6,
γ2 = 1.
4.2 Non-separable utility with elastic preferences
Let us next consider the case where γ2 = 0.4.
15 Notice that γ2 < 1 implies u12(c, g) > 0, such
that private and public consumption enter the utility function as complements. We keep the
structural parameters of the model, except for γ2, at the same values also used in our first
example, and we compute again approximations to the equilibrium policy functions G, B, C
15Given γ1 = 5/6, this parameterization implies σ = −cu11(c, g)/u1(c, g) = 1− γ1(1− γ2) = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium policy and value functions (γ2 = 0.4)
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Notes: the figure displays numerical approximations to the public consumption policy G(b) (top-left panel),
the debt policy B(b) (top-right panel), the private consumption policy C(b) (bottom-left panel), and the value
function V (b) (bottom-right panel) under the interest rate instrument policy (solid line) and the money growth
instrument policy (dashed line). The underlying parameters are β = βM = 0.96, βF = 0.8, α = 2/3, γ1 = 5/6,
γ2 = 0.4.
and the value function V . Figure 2 displays these functions.
As in the case γ2 = 1, we observe that the money growth instrument leads to a higher level
of public consumption and debt compared to the interest rate instrument. In contrast to the
case γ2 = 1, however, the money growth instrument now leads to a higher level of private
consumption. Intuitively, this results from private and public consumption being complements:
the high level of fiscal spending increases the marginal utility of private consumption, making
29
it attractive for the private sector to raise its consumption level. Moreover, as revealed by the
bottom-right panel of Figure 2, the money growth instrument choice leads also to a higher level
of private-sector welfare. Thus, unlike in the example with γ2 = 1, the money growth rate
turns out to be the optimal monetary instrument.
The intuition behind this finding can be understood as follows. Independent of the monetary
instrument choice, the policy-makers in the economy face a time-inconsistency problem. With
future consumption being more elastic than current consumption, this time-inconsistency prob-
lem leads to a sub-optimally low level of consumption under discretionary policy-making.16 In
the present example, fiscal impatience counteracts this time-inconsistency problem. It gener-
ates a public spending bias and, as private and public consumption are complements, leads
to a higher level of private consumption. Fiscal impatience thus influences the equilibrium
allocation in a way that moves this allocation closer to the second-best, which ultimately has
a beneficial effect on private-sector welfare. Allowing for this positive effect on the equilibrium
allocation, the money growth instrument turns out to be preferable to the interest rate for the
specific economy under consideration (featuring γ2 = 0.4).
Taken together, the two examples discussed above demonstrate that the welfare ranking across
monetary instruments is not unambiguous. This is true even though we allow for fiscal impa-
tience, whose effect on the equilibrium allocation can be eliminated if the central bank adopts
the nominal interest rate as its instrument. Actually, the second example illustrates that a
fiscal spending bias, which only unfolds in a money growth regime, can be welfare improving
because it counteracts the monetary time-inconsistency problem.
16To see this, consider a government with commitment power. When current consumption is relatively
inelastic, this government would choose a policy plan that features higher distortions in the initial period than
in later periods, and thus lower consumption in the initial period than in later periods (i.e., it would choose an
increasing consumption path). Absent commitment, the incentive to choose a low level of current consumption
is present in every period, and thus consumption will be sub-optimally low in every period. A detailed discussion
of this mechanism is provided, among others, in Nicolini (1998) and Diaz-Gimenez, Giovannetti, Marimon, and
Teles (2008).
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5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the monetary instrument problem in the context of a dynamic game
between the fiscal authority, the central bank, and the private sector. We have shown that,
as long as there is a conflict of interest between the two policy makers, the choice of mon-
etary instrument affects the equilibrium outcome. In particular, when the fiscal authority’s
preferences are characterized by relative impatience, the central bank can prevent distortions
arising from the bias in fiscal preferences by resorting to the interest rate as its instrument.
Nevertheless, the optimal choice of instrument critically depends on the economic environment
under consideration: the money growth instrument is preferable whenever fiscal impatience has
positive welfare effects, which is easily possible under lack of commitment.
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